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## REVIEWS

*Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy.* By JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, Ph. D. Pp. 304. Price, \$1.50. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1901.

*American Diplomatic Questions.* By JOHN B. HENDERSON, JR. Pp. 529, Price, \$3.50. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901.

*Foundations of American Foreign Policy.* By ALBERT BUSHNELL HART. Professor of History in Harvard University. Pp. 307. Price, \$1.50. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901.

The Albert Shaw Lectures on American Diplomacy at Johns Hopkins University, delivered in 1901 by Dr. Callahan, have been embodied in a small volume entitled the "Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy." Various writers have heretofore covered parts of the diplomacy of the secession movement, but the pioneer task of carefully ransacking all the available literature: diaries, state papers, newspapers, correspondence, etc., remained for Dr. Callahan. The preface says that the book "attempts to give a careful and purely historical presentation of the theories, purposes, policies, diplomatic efforts and difficulties of the secessionists, as reflected from their official archives and other original records."

In the first chapter Dr. Callahan traces in an interesting manner the history of his documentary sources. The day the Confederates set fire to Richmond, Secretary of State Benjamin destroyed the Secret Service Papers. That evening trains carried from the city all the Confederate archives, including those of the State Department. Thus it happened that the Union forces captured at the Confederate capital only the refuse of its state papers. Still, a bureau of "Rebel Archives" was soon established in Washington to which from time to time important Confederate documents were added. The most important addition to the diplomatic records was the so-called "Pickett papers" which contained nearly all of the Confederate diplomatic correspondence and State Department archives. These papers, hidden in a barn after their transportation from Richmond, were later secretly stored in trunks and taken to Canada by Colonel Pickett, from whom they were bought for \$75,000 by the Grant administration. Dr. Callahan says that Secretary Benjamin desired to leave no historical material behind him and so abhorred any searching of his private papers that a short time before his death he destroyed all such manuscripts. The public and private correspondence of Mason, the Confederate agent to England, was completely preserved and is now in the possession of his daughter. To these papers the author was allowed access. Slidell, the Confederate agent to France, destroyed most of his private correspondence covering the period.

Dr. Callahan devotes a chapter to the general history of the organization of the Confederate government, its policies and finances; but one is disappointed not to find anywhere in his book a connected history of the Confederate State Department. Here it was that the foreign policies were formed and changed from time to time as the exigency of events seemed to demand.

A picture of this organ of the Confederate diplomacy during the four years' struggle could be made most interesting and valuable. Dr. Callahan quotes James L. Orr, the chairman of the Confederate House Committee on Foreign Relations, as saying that "the Confederacy never had any foreign policy nor did it ever attempt any high diplomacy," but the author says, "Whatever may be thought of this statement the failure of the Confederacy was certainly not due to any deficiency in the number of its agents abroad."

In a chapter entitled "The Confederate Foreign Policy," Dr. Callahan has apparently organized his material with reference to the geographical proximity of the places to which the Confederate agents were sent, regardless of whether the place was a national capital or a mere colony. The author's facts are grouped and presented in the following order: Commissions to Washington in 1861 and 1865; agents to Canada in 1864; agents to Mexico in 1861 and 1864; agents to Cuba, Nassau and Bermuda, and finally a general account of the diplomatic agents sent to Europe. The author shows that recognition or supplies or both were sought from England, France, Spain and Russia. One paragraph (p. 83) presents very concisely the Confederate foreign policy: "Mr. Davis and his followers at first expected to produce a cotton famine which would induce England and France to break the blockade and recognize the Confederacy. Later, they were willing to offer special commercial advantages to secure the same and proposed to give Napoleon a large amount (\$7,000,000 worth) of cotton for the loan of a squadron. They also favored French and Spanish designs in America and in order to obtain a treaty of alliance, intimated their readiness to guarantee the possessions of those powers. They made England and France a base for secret attempts to fit out vessels. They endeavored to disturb internal affairs and create complications which would serve the interests of the Confederacy. Finally, in a paroxysm of desperation, they proposed to secure emancipation for recognition, and in negotiations with London syndicates agreed to guarantee cotton for money to secure ships to break the blockade." Many were opposed to Mr. Davis' cotton famine policy and Dr. Callahan says (p. 89), "The shipment . . . of cotton to Liverpool during the first year of the war would have strengthened the Confederate chances of securing a navy, but there were probably insurmountable obstacles to this policy." The author concludes (p. 106), "The blockade by sea and by land was the principal cause of Confederate failure."

Another chapter, entitled "The Mission of Mason and Slidell," in a general way, embraces only their original instructions and the difficulties they encountered in reaching their destinations.

We are accustomed to think of the partiality of Great Britain toward the secessionists. The other side is strikingly shown by the many bitter protests of the Southerners against the indifference of the British. Some notion of "that" indifference may be gleaned from the following quotation from the *London Times* of January 11, 1862: "They (Mason and Slidell) are here for their own interests, and . . . rather disappointed perhaps that their detention has not provoked a new war. They must not suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great war that they are precious in

our eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two of their own negroes. Let the Commissioners come up quietly to town and have their say with anybody who may have time to listen to them. For our part, we cannot see how anything they may have to tell can turn the scale of British duty and deliberation."

About a year later there was a general feeling among the Confederate leaders that the various agents sent to secure foreign recognition and intervention had failed and that the Davis government should recall all its foreign commissioners, but this was never done. Davis, Benjamin, Mason and the others conducting the foreign affairs hoped for help from abroad until the very last. Especially did they rely for some assistance upon Napoleon III., who, it seems, was desirous enough to recognize the South but hardly dared to do so without the co-operation of England. In October, 1862, Napoleon intimated to Slidell that the Confederacy might build ships in France. Orders were given and when later Napoleon, because of the vigorous American protests, prevented the ships from sailing, the Confederate authorities considered that they had been "duped" by Napoleon. Dr. Callahan says, "Perhaps Napoleon had expected Confederate victory, or contemplated an alliance which would give him an opportunity to allow the vessels to go, but he finally found it necessary to disown any arrangement which would offend the United States."

Dr. Callahan has collected a mass of interesting facts upon an interesting subject, but has not properly digested the facts—they seem at times thrown together in vague connection. His categories of organization are imperfectly worked out and there is a frequent repetition of the same events in the same language. In short, the book has been too hastily put together to do justice to the author's exhaustive research. Dr. Callahan has refrained throughout from unnecessarily injecting his own ideas into the historical record, and where called upon, has given a fairly unprejudiced interpretation of the facts.

Mr. Henderson, in a volume of more than five hundred pages, has written on five topics of American diplomacy. The first essay deals with "The Fur Seals and the Bering Sea Award." After remarking upon Russia's claim to exclusive jurisdiction over portions of the Bering Sea and the protests of the American and English governments in consequence thereof, Mr. Henderson takes up the history of Alaska from the time of its cession to the United States under a treaty whose "terse description" of the western boundary, the author believes, gave rise to the "confusing implication that Russia intended . . . to convey to the United States not only all the islands . . . but, in deed, the actual sea itself, with full and exclusive dominion over the same." Mr. Henderson then notes that the law of Congress, framed for the government of Alaska, "did not clearly signify the extent to which the United States claimed jurisdiction in Bering Sea, but simply enacted that the 'laws of the United States . . . are extended to and over all mainland, islands and waters of the territory ceded to the United States by the Emperor of Russia . . .,' and that 'no person shall kill any . . . fur-bearing animals within the limits of Alaska territory or in the waters thereof . . .'"

Mr. Henderson goes on to show the rapid development of the seal industry, the growth of pelagic sealing, the problem of the United States to put a stop to this ruinous practice of seal hunting, and says, "the temptation" to assert "a claim of *mare clausum* was great." He notes how Mr. French, Acting Secretary of the Treasury (1881), succumbed, as it were, to this interpretation of "the waters thereof" and thereby reversed the previous position assumed by Secretary Boutwell; how the Cleveland and Harrison administrations seized and condemned several British vessels engaged in pelagic sealing; how in the face of British protests the State Department tried to establish the legality of the American position and how the matter was submitted to arbitration. Mr. Henderson writes, "Although it has been expressly disavowed by Mr. Blaine that the United States put forth any claim to *mare clausum* over the Bering Sea, it is nevertheless impossible to consider the American position before the Arbitration Tribunal in Paris as otherwise than an attempt to justify such a contention. . . . It is to be regretted that in this matter the United States should have appeared before . . . the civilized world in the unfortunate light of taking a step backward in order to resuscitate . . . a defunct mediæval doctrine." The author closes his entertaining essay with the observation that "there is no legal remedy" against the pelagic sealing and that "the chances are strongly in favor of a total destruction of the herd within a few years, unless some immediate understanding can be had with Great Britain to check the onslaught."

In an account of "The Interoceanic Canal Problem," Mr. Henderson has drawn out in detail the history of the various attempts of private corporations to build an Isthmian canal. Concerning the now abrogated Clayton-Bulwer treaty, he says, "Had Mr. Clayton been less actuated by fear, he might have utilized for his own benefit those very threats of war which terrorized him into concluding a bad bargain." Of Sir Henry Bulwer's diplomatic tactics he remarks, "The method . . . cannot be characterized as dishonest. It was 'clever' in so far as he outwitted his antagonist by playing upon his fears and profiting by his errors in judgment." After an unprejudiced inquiry into the arguments for and against a neutralized canal, the author gives it as his opinion that not only the present treaty obligations demand, but self-interest, pure and simple, will be better subserved by a neutralized inter-oceanic canal.

In the essay on the United States and Samoa, Mr. Henderson writes, "Samoa was like a teapot in which a tempest raged while three great nations jostled each other in fussy endeavors to keep the little pot from boiling over;" but he goes on to say, "If the Samoan episode appears trivial to the general observer, it possessed, nevertheless, a pathetic side to the philanthropist, who could not fail to see in this South Sea enterprise of England, Germany and the United States, another demonstration of the withering influence of civilization upon semi-barbarous peoples."

Mr. Henderson considers that the chief interest in the Samoan matter lies in the fact that "it reveals the first genuine instance of departure (by the United States) from a time-honored policy of non-intervention in the domestic

affairs of alien nations." By the Treaty of Berlin in June, 1889, which provided an elaborate system of government for Samoa, "the United States stood pledged, for the first time in its history, to share the responsibilities of good government in another nation and to assume, in a measure, the rôle of protector. . . . The responsibilities . . . brought only vexatious cares, expense, the loss of several naval vessels, the sacrifice of many lives and several times threatened to involve the country in war." The author does not believe the final acquisition by the treaty of 1900 of Tutuila and its valuable harbor of Pago-Pago can be ascribed to the Berlin treaty, since American rights in the harbor antedated the treaty and were merely held in abeyance so long as the triple dominion existed.

Mr. Henderson's essay on the Monroe Doctrine shows a good understanding of international law and our diplomatic history. He considers the "doctrine" in law to be merely a measure of self-defence whose justification in every instance must rest on the ground of self-preservation. He traces the history in the well-known manner in which it has several times appeared and concludes that "to consign the Monroe Doctrine to its appropriate place of political significance in American history is by no means to deprive the American people of self-protection. It is only to rid the mind of a disturbing factor in the determination of foreign questions—to leave the judgment free to measure danger by the exigencies of the present, and not the remembrance of the fears which are of the past."

In the last topic discussed Mr. Henderson deals with the Northeast Coast Fisheries which, he says, is a "diplomatic problem that has involved a host of legal questions." He is too good a lawyer to see any sound legal basis for the American claim to a *right* to fish in British waters. He closes his article by observing that, "changing conditions in the methods of fishing have operated more largely in the last ten years to do away with the troublesome 'fishery question' than have a century of diplomatic skirmishes."

Mr. Henderson has an entertaining style and, though at times, it may seem somewhat rhetorical yet, in general, it is interesting. Facts and principles are stated without any savor of the jingo historian, and still Mr. Henderson is always thoroughly patriotic. Mistakes and faults are sympathetically discussed regardless of who committed them.

In as much as the book contains little that has not already been written in some form and is entirely without citation of authority, it is probably intended for the general reader. But even for that purpose it is quite unintelligible that it should be without an index. There are several slight errors in expression and fact. Thus on page 482 and following he gives credence to the "Marbois letter" and the much discussed question of "French intrigue and treachery"; on page 314 he has Canning succeed Castlereagh as Prime Minister; on page 37 he fails to distinguish between the false translation of a Russian document and the falsity of the document itself and on page 366 he speaks of "*Henry Irving* (as) the American Representative in Spain" in 1843; nor is it correct to say (p. 447) that "in the course of three-quarters of a century," "whenever a threat, real or fancied, has come in the shape of aggression in the Western Hemisphere, the United States Government has asserted

its right . . . of self-protection, but called [it] instead the Monroe Doctrine. The phrase 'Monroe Doctrine' has been preferred." As the author himself has pointed out elsewhere the "phrase 'Monroe Doctrine'" was rarely, if ever, officially used previous to President Cleveland's ultimatum to Great Britain.

"Foundations of American Foreign Policy" seems a rather large name for a little book which contains few facts that have not already appeared, analyzed in a profounder and more suggestive way. The volume is merely a bunch of magazine articles caught together under a misleading title, though in justice to the author, the preface says that, "the book does not attempt to present a sketch of the diplomatic history of the United States, nor even to describe all the foundations which underlie the conscious or unconscious policy of the government toward other countries."

Mr. Hart everywhere insists upon the two theses, that "the United States has from its birth been in both hemispheres a true world power" and that the "idea of national colonies is as old as the republic." That both contentions are in a sense true no one would deny, but Mr. Hart contends for more; though occasionally he seems to make a slip, as it were, and acknowledges that recent events have introduced fundamental changes, e. g., when he writes that "up to the Spanish War, Brother Jonathan never looked in the face the prospect of a Union in which there should be permanent colonies."

To prove that the United States has always been a world power, Mr. Hart exaggerates the diplomatic importance of our early history and perhaps belittles the significance of later events. Thus, "our envoys, Franklin, John Adams and Jay . . . sat almost as arbiters in what was virtually a European Congress." He even misstates the facts when he writes, "We do not appreciate the reputation which was made by the preliminaries of peace in 1782. The first effect . . . was the desire of European powers to make treaties. . . . Holland came first." The preliminary articles were signed November, 1782, whereas the treaty with Holland was made the preceding month. In further emphasis of the effect of the preliminary treaty of 1782, he says, "The climax was reached when John Adams . . . was received by George the Third" and then he repeats Adams' pompous words. The reviewer is unable to see the logic of the author's "climax." To prove his point Mr. Hart labors on, observing that: "the war of 1812 really showed the right of the United States to the name of world power"; and that "the Peace of Ghent was a public acknowledgment that the country had come to its majority at last."

Mr. Hart is not an advocate of the Monroe Doctrine. He traces hastily the four most important of "the many senses in which this perhaps over-worked phrase has been used," then outlines the changes that have transpired at home and abroad, and concludes by saying "some clear and definite bases may be laid down for any permanent policy in Pan-American affairs." Mr. Hart then suggests seven principles "upon which the 'doctrine of permanent interest' must proceed." President Monroe, who is described as having a "somewhat sluggish mind" is given no credit for the authorship or form of his "doctrine."

The last article, entitled "A Brief Bibliography of American Diplomacy," "is a convenient list of the more accessible books" in which one is a little surprised not to find mentioned the Secret Journals of the Continental Congress or the United Revised Statutes or Statutes at Large. Except for this chapter, the entire absence of footnotes or references of any kind to authorities will render the book of little value to students. The few errors of fact noted are, doubtless, due to Mr. Hart's broad generalizations and his eagerness to maintain his own interpretation of our history. It is, of course, clearly wrong to say Hawaii was acquired by treaty or that the territory of the Maine boundary dispute was "divided nearly on the line of the rejected" award of the King of the Netherlands.

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*Primitive Semitic Religion To-day.* By SAMUEL IVES CURTISS. Pp. 277.  
Price, \$2.00. Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1902.

Professor Curtiss' book is a collection of customs prevailing chiefly among Moslems, but to a certain extent also among Christians and Jews, illustrative of the survivals of ancient religious rites and of the beliefs on which the rites are based. The nineteen chapters of the book cover such a variety of topics as conceptions of God, local deities, sacred personages, high places, shrines, vows, festivals, sacrifices, and the use of blood, and Professor Curtiss is to be commended for the diligence displayed in gathering such interesting material during his three journeys through Syria and Palestine, 1898-1901. Not all of the material is new, for numerous other travelers have been struck by the same peculiar customs which aroused Professor Curtiss' attention, but his illustrations are far more numerous than are to be met with in other accounts of Palestinian travels and he has arranged his material in an orderly manner. The treatment of the material, however, leaves much to be desired. Despite the fact that the author, as he himself tells us, has been a Professor of Old Testament Literature in a western institution for twenty years, the thought does not appear to have occurred to him until he entered Palestine, that the centres of ancient culture necessarily show traces of the past in popular customs and that these traces persist, despite the most radical political and religious changes that a country undergoes. Apparently Professor Curtiss did not make the acquaintance of such investigators of religious rites as the late Robertson Smith, J. G. Frazer, H. C. Trumbull, F. B. Jevons—to mention only the most prominent names—until after he had been struck by the abundance of "survivals" in Syria and Palestine, and what is still more strange, the travels of Doughty and Burckhardt and the works of Clermont-Ganneau, Conder and others were likewise unknown to him until a short time ago. Otherwise, he could hardly have conceived the strange delusion which one encounters on the first page of this book, and to which the author constantly reverts that he has made "remarkable," "wonderful" and "startling" discoveries. The frequency with which these adjectives are strewn through the book constitutes its most serious defect,